Governmental intervention in credit markets typically involves the allocation of credit in the light of market failures. In this paper we evaluate federal lending programs while presuming positive externalities and symmetrically informed market participants. For common objectives of governmental lending institutions we verify that optimal lending structures require the application of the gap lender principle. We also show that lending programs can never be selffinancing, due to the positive subsidy margin. Within this general framework, we contrast the policies of the US SBA and the German KfW and show that neither institution features an optimal lending structure.
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Introduction
Entrepreneurs are frequently restricted by external financiers in exploiting their innovative ideas, which critics typically attribute to unfavorable financing conditions or access barriers to outside capital. Governments oppose these identified malfunctions by intervening in credit markets. In most cases the presumption of asymmetric information between borrower and debtor serves as the basis for evaluating the impact of federal initiatives on the allocation of credit.
1 In contrast, some authors have analyzed governmental policies by assuming symmetric information in the credit market. They justify governmental initiatives with positive externalities, incompletely competitive markets, and regulative intentions.
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In this paper we take the view of symmetrically distributed information between lender and borrower. We find this assumption plausible, given that private banks equipped with improved screening and monitoring techniques are currently moving from volume to risk control modes. 3 Additional incentives to price the risk of loans adequately are provided by the second Basel-Accord. In the future, banks' deposits of equity capital will presumably be more oriented towards default risk, thus requiring a clearer identification of debtors' payment probabilities. This brings borrower-bank-relations closer to informational symmetry.
Whereas credit rationing may call for federal credit programs in markets with asymmetric information, we justify governmental intervention here with the occurrence of positive externalities. Projects fail to be executed, because the private rate of return falls short of financing costs, even though the project is socially desirable. Especially innovative investment projects 2 may feature social benefits that exceed their corresponding private rents. The reluctance of external sources to finance these ventures can then lead to market failure. The credit market fails because the social benefit, as a result of project realization, is not included in the decision calculus of market participants. In their empirical assessment of industrial innovations Mansfield et al. (1977) find that "in about 30 percent of the cases, the private return was so low that no firm, with the advantage of hindsight, would have invested in the innovation, but the social rate of return from the innovation was so high that, from society's point of view, the investment was well worthwhile." 4 In these cases governmental intervention would not only be desirable for entrepreneurs, but also socially legitimate.
Our objective with the current analysis is to examine the conditions for optimal lending structures. The deduction of properties for the optimal design of federal credit programs requires, in a first step, the determination of federal lending objectives. We, therefore, compare the objectives of a sample of governmental institutions and programs. From this comparison three fundamental goals can be determined: (1) Correction of market failure, (2) compliance with the subsidiarity principle, and (3) efficient employment of means.
We evaluate the achievement of the three identified objectives by means of a general credit-market model embedded in an interest-rate-risk-space. We choose this framework for policy evaluation because we believe that most federal lending activities can be reduced to the use of either risk-reduction or interest-rate-subsidization instruments. A construction of two alternative lending structures embodying one of these instruments reveals that both are potentially able to achieve the stated objectives if certain principles are applied. First, federal institutions have to implement the so called gap-lending principle. In contrast to Chaney and Thakor (1985) , we find that the public promotion of entrepreneurial investment projects should 3 concentrate on those investors that are not able to obtain the necessary financing from the credit market and, thus, belong to the market gap. Moreover, cost efficiency would require adjusting the subsidy margin to those loan costs that the borrower is not able to cover, or, in case of processing costs, to sacrifice this flexibility and grant fixed margins. Finally, we find that governmental lending programs can never achieve their goals when they are selffinanced.
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In practice, even optimal lending structures are typically applied with restrictions. As examples we investigate the policies of two prominent institutions, namely the US American SBA and the German KfW. We find differences in the application of the gap-lending principle, self-financing efforts and interest rate limitations. In both cases we find room for additional reform.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we deduce federal lending objectives from the statutes of selected governmental institutions. Section 3 introduces a general model of the credit market, which displays a market failure due to positive externalities. In sections 4 and 5 alternative lending structures are formulated as well as evaluated with respect to their goal achievement and the conditions for optimality are derived. In section 6 we apply this framework to the federal lending structures of the SBA and the KfW. Section 7 shows the stability of our results in a more general situation. We conclude in section 8 with an interpretation of our results.
5 Public lending institutions that implement self-financing programs try to cover their expenditures by charging participants a fee. Examples are the UK's Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS) launched by the Department of Trade and Industry (see Cowling and Clay (1995) ), the American SBA (see SBA (2005) ) and the Canadian SBLA (see Riding (1997) ). 4
Federal Lending Objectives
The international comparison of federal lending institutions reveals three fundamental objectives that are consistently formulated for a large number of federal lending programs:
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The first objective is based on the assumption that there is some form of imperfection in the credit market and that it is the government's duty to correct the corresponding failure. For instance, small and medium-sized enterprises often receive less and smaller loans than public institutions find economically desirable. In terms of its strategic plan, the American SBA, thus, tries to "increase small business success by bridging competitive opportunity gaps facing entrepreneurs" and the Administration is, therefore, "continuing its efforts to bridge the gaps the market place does not address" (SBA 2003) . Accordingly, Rappaport and Wyatt (1990) speak of the SBA's "original goal of overcoming an imperfection in the business credit market." Analogously, Cowling and Clay (1995) (2004) confirms that the financial instruments applied under the MAP "operate on a commercial basis, and so do not entail market distortions," which could be generated by direct financing modes.
The third objective aims at minimizing the costs of lending institutions' operating activities. According to Cowling and Clay (1995) , the British LGS was initiated to generate a "costeffective job/wealth generation package." Analogously, the SBA seeks to "ensure that all 6 SBA programs operate at maximum efficiency and effectiveness" (SBA 2003) . Efficiency is also emphasized by Reich (2002) , who lists this objective explicitly for the KfW.
Although there are several other goals that may also be taken into account, the three fundamental objectives outlined above are shared by most federal lending institutions. In the course of the subsequent analysis we suppose a hybrid federal agency which takes these three objectives as guidelines for policy formulation.
The Model
The presence of asymmetric information is the most common explanation for credit rationing.
Indeed, under information symmetry, it is difficult to justify -from the supply side -why some debtors are offered a private bank loan while others are not. Theoretically, every risk can be compensated by a payment of the respective risk margins. 11 Consequently, all applicants should be supplied with a loan by the banking sector.
Nevertheless, it can be observed that debtors are not always able to obtain funds, even when their risk properties can be revealed. We explain this phenomenon from the demand side: Suppose that all investors value projects by their expected private rates of return. Within each risk class there then exist investments, whose return rates exceed or fall short of the respective risk corresponding market interest rate. Those investors, whose projects feature expected returns that cannot cover the market price, refrain from demanding loans.
In order to construct a model which solely captures this feature, we assume that information between borrowers and debtors is distributed symmetrically, i. e., all investors are perfectly informed about federal and market loan conditions of the participating banks. Conversely, banks have full information concerning the risks and the expected internal return rates of the planned investments. Fig. 1 We focus our analysis on only those entrepreneurial investment projects which feature positive external effects, e. g. because of their innovative content. 14 As with the market rate, we characterize the private rate of return of socially desirable projects by an increasing func-12 We assume that the risk level σ of the projects accounts for an adjustment of collaterals. For instance, if an investor's project possesses an initial risk level of 30 percent and the investor is able to cover 50 percent of the risk level by collaterals, the collateral adjusted risk level σ equals 15 percent. This assumption simplifies the analysis by including collaterals in the risk level, thus allowing us to avoid handling collaterals as an additional parameter within the model. 13 The positive relationship between terms for bank loans and borrower risk defined by the banks' internal credit rating has been shown to be statistically significant by Machauer and Weber (1998) . Although one might expect the ( ) M i σ -curve to be convex, the exact shape crucially depends on how risk is measured. For instance, as long as risk is defined in rating terms, e. g. of Moody's or Standard & Poor's, the market interest-rate curve, indeed, has a convex shape. On the other hand, if risk is measured in terms of default probabilities, its shape is more likely to be concave. As can be seen later, our results are independent of the specific curvature. 14 Innovating businesses are often the source of so-called R&D spillovers. New knowledge, which is generated within the business, is made public when the invention is offered to potential buyers. In this case, other market participants also benefit from the generated knowledge, but without having to discharge an adequate compensation. Consequently, the social rate of return, encompassing the businesses' as well as the other participants' surplus from that innovation, exceeds the private rate of return of the considered business. Griliches (1992) gives an extensive overview of attempts to measure both rates of return and emphasizes that all considered studies show social rates of return to be significantly above private rates.
tion of the investment risk. In Fig. 1 It is important to note that the results of our analysis can be derived for any distribution of eligible investment projects with these two features. We verify this claim in section 7 by explicitly acknowledging individual investment projects.
In Fig. 1 we denote the critical risk level where ( )
In order to specify market failure, we presume for each considered investment project up to a certain risk level of * σ σ > an expected social return rate which lies above the respective market interest rate. By definition, * σ denotes the risk level above which the social rate of return is lower than the market interest rate. Projects with higher risk levels should not be carried out, because their positive effects on the economy do not justify investment costs. Market failure is, therefore, given by the difference: * σ σ − . We refer to this difference as the loan gap. As can be seen from Fig. 1 , the loan gap comprises all eligible investment projects lying below the market interest-rate curve.
The subsidiarity principle embodies the requirement for competitive neutrality between the federal agency and the private banking sector. In other words, credit-market activities of the public institution must not create additional market distortions by negatively affecting private banks' business. The most common way to fulfill this principle is to allocate federal offerings indirectly through private banks. Under this procedure, private banks only grant loans voluntarily, if their incomes comply with laissez-faire market conditions. Consequently, public loan activities are blocked, if private banks are not compensated adequately. In the 9 following, we focus on those lending structures which utilize this indirect lending procedure and, thus, satisfy the second federal lending objective.
The efficient use of means, as the third fundamental goal, will be measured in terms of the lowest possible costs for a given amount of internalized externalities. In order to evaluate federal credit programs from a cost perspective, we assume the number of projects in a certain risk class to be limited to one. Consequently, there exist exactly σ projects with a risk of at most σ in the modeled economy. This enables us to construct cost areas within our graphical model as the risk axis now also serves as a quantity axis.
Alternative Lending Structures
We evaluate alternative lending structures by explicitly focusing on two parameters: interest rates and risk levels. We justify this approach with the observation that public agencies essentially have two instruments to make investment projects marketable: interest rate subsidies and measures of risk reduction, e. g. the application of a guarantee rate, which we denote by γ . 15 In both cases governmental programs lead to a duality of market and federal loan prices.
We denote the federal interest rates of publicly supported funds by ( , ) . Aside from specific details, this is the institutional arrangement under which many countries operate, e. g. the USA, UK, Canada, Japan, France, and the Netherlands. 16 The guarantee reduces the private banks' costs of credit risk, thus inducing them to lower the price for the guarantee complemented funds in a competitive market. As a consequence, lower risk premiums let investors' demand for conditioned federal loans rise. The implications of structure (a) are illustrated in Fig. 2 . 16 For detailed information see Nitani et al. (2005) and Christensen et al. (1999) . ). This setting characterizes the current lending arrangement of the German KfW in a significant part of its programs. According to Stiglitz et al. (2000) interest rate subsidies are also common in Ireland, Scotland and Wales.
The qualitative outcome is the same as with structure (a), namely a subsidization of the private banks' cost structures. Consequently, the banking sector competes with loan prices until profit levels match the former market situation. Fig. 3 shows the effect of structure (b) on the credit market. Graphically, the agency transfers the margin 
Optimal Lending Structures
In order to compare the alternative lending structures, we assess their goal achievement given the three fundamental objectives, namely correction of market failure, compliance with the subsidiarity principle, and efficient use of means.
Complete market failure correction requires the following condition to hold:
As one can verify from Figures 2 and 3, in both scenarios described in the previous section, the federal agency achieves a complete market failure correction, provided subsidies are available and sufficiently large for all projects within the loan gap.
17 Independent of the respective policy, the interest rate that all loan-gap applicants discharge must be covered by the expected returns of their projects to ensure their participation in the federal lending program.
By construction, both lending structures also comply with the subsidiarity principle. Note that market conditioned loans are fully crowded out by public loans, irrespective of the underlying risk properties. In other words, no applicant with a risk profile between 0 and * σ demands a non-subsidized loan with a higher price. Nevertheless, the subsidiarity principle ensures that the private banking sector can distribute subsidized loans in a competitively neutral form.
In order to assess the efficient use of means of both alternative lending structures, the dif- For any lending structure equation (2) describes the necessary condition to achieve inner optimality. However, it does not question whether the structure itself is optimal. In panels (a) and (b) of Fig. 4 areas B, C, and D characterize the redistribution of capital from the agency to investors of all risk classes without any superior goal achievement, thus quantifying the inefficiencies of the individual lending structures. In contrast, area A represents costs that are necessary to correct the market failure. Under an optimal lending structure it is, therefore, sufficient to reimburse the private banking sector for only those costs that investors in the loan gap are not able to cover. In other words, investors should be obliged to carry credit costs up to the maximum amount ( ) P i σ that is covered by their project. For the federal interest rate this implies
Condition (3) requires the public agency to implement a federal interest rate for loan gap applicants which corresponds exactly to the respective private return rate of the project. To accomplish this, one option is to reimburse the private bank with a flexible interest margin.
Alternatively, the agency could provide a flexible guarantee rate, which reduces any risk level [ ]
. Consequently, a costminimizing agency should act as a pure gap lender, if it wishes to avoid promoting projects, which would also be financed by the private banking sector without intervention. This implies that the lending structures discussed above both entail inefficiencies.
Second, market failure based on positive externalities cannot be corrected by a selffinancing lending program. Any fee required to finance the subsidy margin can be interpreted
as a reduction of the expected private rate of return, which by itself would already require a higher subsidy margin. By giving the fee back to investors in the form of an interest-rate subsidy or a guarantee, the private rate of return could at best reach its initial level. Consequently, the costs of area A cannot be covered by investors, since they can afford to pay only
In practice, however, processing costs arise, because the guarantee rate or, alternatively, the reimbursement interest margin must be adjusted to the characteristics of every specific project in order to achieve optimality. As long as processing costs are sufficiently large -at least as large as area B in Fig. 6 -the federal agency should either introduce a fixed guarantee rate (panel (a)) or a constant interest margin (panel (b)), while both should be available only for loan-gap applicants. The amount of the corresponding subsidy is given by the following optimization problem:
min arg subject to condition (1) and
(a) Fixed guarantee rate, market interest rate (b) Fixed interest subsidization, no guarantee 
16 By fixing guarantee rates or interest-rate subsidies, minimum costs of the amount A + B accrue when the gap-lender principle is applied. In contrast, if policy instruments were riskdependent, the ( ) γ σ , * F i -curve could be adjusted flexibly to the ( )
-curve. Specifically, optimality then requires the subsidy margin to be adjusted flexibly to the exact financial needs of the debtor (area A). The situation changes, though, when processing costs are taken into account. Programs with fixed spending margins then become optimal. Area B, thus, displays the additional costs of designing risk-independent promotional instruments.
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In contrast to areas A and B, which have a specific function in correcting market failure, areas C and D in Fig. 4 depict costs that are avoidable. Specifically, area C represents costs that arise from violating the gap-lender principle, i. e. expenditures from promoting projects that could just as well be served by the market. In contrast, area-D costs are related to loangap applicants, but they exceed the amount necessary to correct market failure, e. g. due to
imprecise policy targeting. It should be noted, however, that the implementation of
and, hence, the avoidance of these excess subsidies, requires exact knowledge of ( ) P i σ . In practice, the acknowledgement of area-D costs, therefore, seems inevitable.
The Lending Structures of the SBA and KfW
The lending structure with a fixed guarantee rate for loan gap applicants corresponds to the policy of the American SBA's 7 (a) Loan Guarantee Program. To ensure that only the loan gap is filled, banks must verifiably deny a loan offer under market conditions -this is referred to as the Credit Elsewhere Test (SBA (2004) § 7. (a) (1) (A)): "CREDIT ELSEWHERE. -No financial assistance shall be extended pursuant to this subsection if the applicant can obtain
19 Within our framework the institutional arrangement of the SBA is generally optimal, provided that processing costs are sufficiently large.
However, the SBA places two operational barriers on its program. First, "the SBA's legislative package includes language that will give the agency the authority to adjust the fees every year to keep the 7(a) program at a zero subsidy." 20 As the preceding analysis shows, a completely self-financing program can never correct market failure. 21 Second, the SBA places an upper limit, iˆ, on the interest rate charged by private banks when loans are complemented by federal guarantees. 22 Fig. 7 depicts the impact of the SBA's practiced lending policy of a fixed guarantee rate and an interest-rate limitation. According to Riding and Haines (2001) lenders under the UK's Loan Guarantee Scheme must also certify to have denied applicants a conventional loan, due to lack of collateral. Hence, the UK's Department of Trade and Industry may also be considered as a gap lender. In contrast, Hatakeyama, Yamamori and Nakamura (1997) state that "the credit guarantee corporations of Japan and the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF) have set clear policies of extending guarantee services to any small entrepreneurs with good business reputation." 20 See SBA (2005). 21 As an example for the ineffectiveness of self-financing programs, Cowling (1998) analyses the attempts of the British LGS to avoid former losses by equalizing revenues and expenditures. In 1984, the increase of the guarantee premium from 3 to 5% and the reduction of the guarantee rate from 80 to 70% resulted in a dramatic fall of take-up rates from 1,600 to 40 loans per quarter.
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Within the framework of our model, the interest-rate cap could again interfere with the SBA's objective of complete market failure correction. As long as the loan price limit iˆ lies
, the interest-rate cap is ineffective and, thus, does not hinder market failure correction. In this case, the SBA would, indeed, implement the optimal lending structure. On the other hand, if ( ) ( )
, objective 1 is no longer met. For project risks above σˆ2 3 the interest-rate cap renders the private bank's compensation below market conditions and thus impedes its cooperation -this is the case illustrated in Fig. 7 . In the worst case, iˆ falls short of ( )
. As a consequence, the SBA cannot correct market failure with a fixed guarantee rate at all, and the market situation is the same as without governmental intervention. Since any effective interest-rate limitation below the ( ) γ σ , switched from fixed to risk-dependent interest rates and abolished the warranting of guarantees. Nevertheless, similar to the SBA, the KfW continues to limit the price-setting scope for private banks by now administering interest-rate caps for every specially defined risk class.
23 σˆ can be obtained from the equation
. 24 In support of this conclusion, the European Commission (2003) argues that "for allowing the microcredit operator to be fully self-sustainable, the public authority could increase the ceiling of usury rate, in countries where such a rate is legally binding."
Under the present KfW lending structure (Fig. 4, panel (b) ) optimal lending is possible, in principle, given that processing costs are sufficiently large. Nevertheless, our analysis shows that two potential obstacles still need to be removed to ensure optimality. First, the KfW should refrain from offering its loan conditions to all eligible investors and, instead, focus on loan-gap applicants. Second, in line with our argument concerning the SBA, the KfW should abolish its interest-rate limitation.
Generalization of the Model
Our conclusions in the previous sections were all derived within the analytical framework based on the construction of the ( )
-curve in Fig. 1 . In this section we show how our results carry over to a more general situation, where socially desirable investments are scattered around the market interest-rate curve, instead of being allocated along a clearly defined ( ) σ P i -curve. The significant difference between both approaches is given by diverging distributions of investment projects and, thereby, varying degrees of market failure.
In Fig. 1 the market failure is depicted on the risk axis by the risk interval, in which the ( ) σ P i -curve falls short of the market interest-rate curve. In the more general setting, though, the market gap cannot be determined on the basis of risk levels alone. Moreover, in order to identify whether a particular investment project is situated below the market curve, additional knowledge of the private rate of return is required.
Without loss of generality, consider, for example, lending structure (b), depicted in Fig. 4 , where the federal agency subsidizes the interest rate imposed on eligible projects by a constant amount. The associated costs, characterized by areas A, B, C, and D, can be represented in Fig. 8 The distance to the market interest rate curve is largest for project 1 P , which we suppose represents the marginal project that the federal agency must promote in order to fully correct market failure. To make this project marketable a minimum subsidy of the amount 1 a is required. In practice, the actual reimbursement margin will presumably exceed the necessary minimum 1 a , thus creating a slack which we denote by d .
Due to the policy of a constant subsidy margin, the same cumulative amount 1 a d + must be granted to all projects. Therefore, consider next project 2 P , another candidate for promotion. This investment could be subsidized with a minimum amount 2 a , but the additional cost 1 2 b a a = − arises, because of the non-risk adjusted constant subsidy margin. In addition, the slack d accrues here as well. Finally, consider project 3 P , which normally should not be eligible for promotion under the gap-lender principle, since its private rate of return meets market requirements. Hence, federal funds spent on this project create costs of the amount c
( 1 2 a d a b d = + = + + ), which could also be avoided under an optimal lending structure.
Conclusion
Our objective in this paper was to develop a general framework for evaluating alternative federal lending structures by means of an interest-rate-risk model and observable federal lending objectives. Our comparison reveals that federal credit programs are only efficient when they are designed as gap lending structures. This entails the promotion of only those applicants that are not able to obtain financing from the credit market. Ideally, the subsidy margin should exactly reimburse the loan costs that investors are not able to pay themselves, i. e. the difference between market loan costs and the private rate of return. Since this requires a flexible subsidy margin that has to be adjusted to the project characteristics in each individual case, lending structures, which do not employ such flexible instruments, can never achieve optimality. As we pointed out, though, the adjustment of risk dependent instruments causes processing costs. Thus, with sufficiently high processing costs, the least expensive way of correcting market failure is to impose a constant subsidy margin over all projects. We also showed that every federal lending system which aims at correcting market failure due to positive externalities requires governmental cost contributions and, thus, cannot be self-financing. This result stands in line with the analyses of Gale (1990) and Williamson (1994) who derive similar results for credit markets characterized by asymmetric information.
In practice, as we have found, the derived conditions for optimal lending structures are not consistently applied. Although the American SBA does act as gap lender, it simultaneously limits the interest rate which can be maximally charged by private banks, if loans are complemented by federal guarantees. In addition, the SBA's statutes require the agency to act as self-financer, i. e., to finance the 7(a) loan guarantee program with the fees of participants.
These two restrictions could prevent the SBA from achieving market failure correction. Interest-rate caps can also be observed with the policy of the German KfW. Moreover, the KfW promotes investors regardless of whether or not they can obtain financing elsewhere, thus 22 indicating structural inefficiencies here as well. Unless the current practices of the SBA and KfW can be justified with arguments beyond the scope of our model, we see room for greater efficiency and, thus, further reform with both institutions.
